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Review Essay
Ethnic Minorities and the Politics of Identity in Iran
The present review essay is of a novel format: two authors working in the same ﬁeld
introduce each other’s works, and then pose a number of questions to each other. The
aim is to facilitate dialogue between scholars occupied with similar issues, theories,
methods or problems, and to share their discussions with others. Here, Alam Saleh,
Lecturer in Middle Eastern Politics, University of Exeter, and Rasmus Christian
Elling, Assistant Professor of Iranian Studies, University of Copenhagen, introduce
each other’s recent books on ethnic minorities, identity and nationalism in post-
revolution Iran. These introductions are then followed by questions and answers in
relation to the topics covered by the books.
Ethnic Identity and the State in Iran, Alam Saleh, New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2013, ISBN 978-1-137-31086-6, 233 pp. (hardback)
Introduced by Rasmus Christian Elling
In this, his ﬁrst monograph, Saleh studies the contentious junction between ethnic
diversity, geopolitics and security in Iran. He argues that the biggest single threat to
Iran’s domestic security, indeed to Iranian national identity, is the increasing discon-
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tent amongst its ethnic minorities. Saleh’s book seeks to gauge and analyze this threat
by employing various research strategies.
Firstly, following a wide-ranging survey of theories on security, ethnic conﬂict,
nationalism and identity, Saleh circles in on societal security and relative deprivation
as the two main concepts, and Barry Buzan and Ted Gurr as the main thinkers
through whose ideas he will explore the book’s topics: ethnic inequality, collective
identity crisis and the potential of ethnic conﬂict in Iran. Saleh thus aims to highlight
an important dimension of Iranian politics that is often neglected in the international
focus on Iran as a nuclear threat to “the West”—i.e. the Islamic Republic as a threat to
itself. This self-threat, Saleh argues, has arisen from the way that the state authorities
have consistently ignored regional discontent, consciously marginalized minorities and
Persianized the non-Persian ethnic groups. Saleh’s book in particular deals with the
Arabs, Azeris, Baluch, Kurds and Turkmen—the ﬁve major ethnic groups that have
seen the highest levels of politicization of ethnicity. The aim of the book is thus to
shift from a narrow realist focus on Iran’s relations with western powers to a more
nuanced understanding of how internal societal factors impact on Tehran’s foreign
policy.
After having outlined the theoretical framework, Saleh investigates Iran’s post-revo-
lution security discourse. He discusses societal security with an emphasis on what he
perceives as inherent contradictions of national and Islamic identity. Due to the
Islamic Republic’s ideology and policy, these contradictions have recently metastasized
into an acute “national identity crisis.” This crisis, combined with the state’s mistreat-
ment of its minorities, Saleh argues, has become a key challenge for the state that inﬂu-
ences its policies at home and abroad.
Following these discussions, Saleh outlines the historical background of ethnic poli-
tics in Iran, shows how cultural diversity has been perceived by the state as a security
challenge and how the use and abuse of ethnic sentiments inside Iran by foreign
powers has made the state consider minorities a threat to territorial integrity. Saleh
then examines the role of domestic hardliners in further exacerbating the tensions
between center and periphery. The last two chapters draw on Saleh’s own ﬁeldwork
in Iran and amongst Iranian diaspora, which include a number of qualitative inter-
views with members of different ethnic groups. These latter chapters further under-
score the main arguments of the book: that the Islamic Republic has created an
internal threat to itself by suppressing minority demands through assimilationist pol-
icies, by keeping segments of society in poverty and by assimilating minority commu-
nities into a majority Persian/Shiite culture. It is argued that ethnic minorities
increasingly display resistance to the discriminatory state policies, demanding recog-
nition, rights and autonomy.
The conclusion of Saleh’s work is a dire warning: discontented ethnic minorities
represent a fundamental challenge to the legitimacy and authority of the Islamic
Republic, if not indeed a threat to a peaceful future for Iran.
2 Elling and Saleh
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Minorities in Iran: Nationalism and Ethnicity after Khomeini, Rasmus Christian
Elling. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, ISBN 978-0-230-11584-2, 267 pp.
(hardback)
Introduced by Alam Saleh
Minorities in Iran provides a rare in-depth analysis of post-revolution Iran’s national
and ethnic identity questions. By problematizing questions of ethnicity, nationalism
and identity, Rasmus Christian Elling aims in this monograph to answer the following
question: who deﬁnes Iranians and the notion of “Iranian-ness”? In so doing, Elling
aptly identiﬁes the actors involved: minority elites, the Persian-centric nationalist
elites and the state. The analysis of the book thus primarily focuses on these three
actors’ discursive-ideological points of view, particularly in post-Khomeini Iran. The
book singles out the four major, transnational and politicized Iranian ethnic
groups, namely the Azeris, Kurds, Arabs and Baluchis, and uses the histories of
these communities to highlight changes in state/periphery relations in modern Iran.
After a theoretical and historical introduction, Elling critically examines Iran’s
ethnic diversity and dominant discourses on national identity, addressing paucities
and biases in existing studies on Iran as well as the contentious politics of naming
and labeling communities inside Iran. Chapter 1 thus contains important critique
of Iranian Studies as a ﬁeld as well as interesting general discussions on the social
theory of identity. In chapter 2, Elling identiﬁes the various historical, political and
socio-economic causes of ethnic minority mobilization in post-revolution Iran. In
doing so, he elaborates on the relationships of each ethnic group with the state, and
then focuses on Khomeini and the post-Khomeini state’s ofﬁcial views and policies
towards ethnic diversity and nationalism. Elling concludes that ethnic minority mobil-
ization in Iran is the result of state policies, under both the Pahlavi shahs and the
Islamic Republic, but that the state’s approach to this challenge has been shaped by
historical and geo-political factors that must be taken into account.
Chapter 3 further explores the Islamic Republic’s ideological discourse (“Islamo-
Nationalism”) and its attempt to address the issues of minorities and cultural diversity.
This is highlighted through ofﬁcial statements and regime-sanctioned literature, as
well as through semantic studies of the state’s response to ethnically framed violence
in Kurdistan, Khuzestan, Azerbaijan and Baluchistan in the period 2005‒07. Elling
particularly highlights the resurgence of nationalism in ofﬁcial rhetoric and the
attempt to appease and attract minority populations while rejecting and oppressing
radical minority activists.
In chapter 4, Elling critically assesses how Persian-centric nationalist elites perceive
certain minorities as a threat in today’s Iran, and in the process he questions the ontol-
ogy of Iranian nationalism. He argues that elite perceptions of the minority issue have
never been unitary but that they have nonetheless cemented a Persian-centric deﬁ-
nition of Iranian-ness that has been detrimental to the country’s minorities and
their role in society and politics. He interestingly links this discussion through theories
on ethnicity and identity, particularly those of Rogers Brubaker and Sinisa Malesevic,
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with the views expressed by minority activists ranging from the reformist and peaceful
to the radical and separatist. In other words, the ﬁnal chapters argue that the three
actors—state, elite and minority activists—draw their approach from the same
logics of essentialism, primordialism and groupism.
Elling’s book ends on a positive note as it describes recent trends in Iranian acade-
mia as well as in popular discourse: trends that point towards a dawning realization
amongst the majority of the minorities’ plight.
Q & A
Rasmus Christian Elling’s Questions for Alam Saleh
Elling: A key theme for both of our books is identity, and in order to understand the min-
ority issue in Iran, we both rely on a theoretical literature that places identity at the core of
modern politics and social life. However, we seem to employ two different conceptualiz-
ations of identity. When questioning the success of the Islamic Republic in “protecting
and establishing a coherent national identity” (p. 45), when stating that mutual distrust
between state and minorities “weakens Iran’s national identity” (p. 125) or when arguing
that Tehran has “mismanage[d]… Iran’s inherently confused historical identity”
(p. 127), I sense that you understand identity as something that can objectively be “estab-
lished,” “protected,” “managed”— and thus measured.
This appears to me to contradict the conceptualization employed in my own work of
identity as a malleable, contextual and contingent self-understanding—indeed, identity
as subjective social process rather than as an objective indicator. The reason for employing
this conceptualization is that I think that by “measuring” identities as “weak” or “strong,”
we are in fact subscribing to the same skewed ontology that nationalism operates within.
My question therefore is: is it Iranian national identity itself, which is under threat? Or is
it rather certain powerful discourses attempting to deﬁne such “Iranian-ness” which are
being questioned?
Saleh: Identity is not a given but rather is invented. Nevertheless, following construc-
tivist approaches, when beliefs, identities or perceptions are constructed they become
real and strong. People thus will kill or get killed for imagined identities, when they are
strongly felt. Ethnic Identity and the State in Iran therefore does not argue that ethno-
nationalist sentiments in Iran are given facts. On the contrary, it argues that such
ethno-nationalist perceptions are socio-historically constructed and imagined.
Hence, identity is the result of a long and deep interaction between several, and
often contradictory, variables and events in Iran’s contemporary history.
In my book, I identify some of the themes and processes, which have had a pro-
found impact in constructing and reconstructing Iran’s national identity. In so
doing, I have looked at, for instance, the role of Orientalists in Iran’s nation-state-
building processes, and how Iranian historians and elites borrowed and exploited
4 Elling and Saleh
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Orientalist imaginaries to construct a coherent, homogenous Iranian identity based on
Persian supremacy. This construct carried within it an anti-Other sentiment—i.e. the
Persian-centric nationalism that was adopted by the Pahlavi shahs until the 1979
Islamic Revolution. The Islamic Republic, on the contrary, attempted to reconstruct
Iran’s national identity by adopting an ontologically different path: Islamism. By
embracing the de-territorialized concept ofUmmah, Ayatollah Khomeini undermined
the idea of a geographically deﬁned Iran. Khomeini argued that Islam is the only deﬁn-
ing and unifying source of identity for Muslims regardless of their nationality, ethni-
city and race. In this sense, Khomeini’s ideology initially neglected Iran’s internal
diversity, particularly the ethnic and religious minorities.
Since the advent of the twentieth century, Iran has gone through three revolutions,
two self-declarations of ethnic minority independence and a number of domestic
uprisings, an eight-year war with Iraq, a revolution in technology and communication,
globalization, many socio-political upheavals, and several major regional changes, all of
which have deeply impacted on ethnic identities in Iran. Employing the concept of
societal security (the dynamics in societies that perceive their identity as threatened)
and relative deprivation theory (discrepancies between what people want and what
they actually gain), I have explored the links between socio-historical events and
their impact in increasing expressions of ethnic identity. However, transforming
ethnic sentiments and frustrations into a major collective force against the state
requires a politicization of ethnic identity that can mobilize societal groups. My
book aims at investigating this process.
Identity confusion has led to the intensiﬁcation of ethnic sentiments, which con-
sequently causes societal insecurity in Iran. However, I frame the explanation for
this in constructivist language. For instance, “politicized identity” indicates that
ethnic sentiments in Iran do not necessarily represent the reality of their situation.
In fact, I argue that feeling deprived may not sufﬁce for the mobilization of ethnic
groups. Ethnic elites, however, aim at politicizing and directing such a constructed
sense of deprivation towards a targeting of the Other; in this case, the Persian and/
or Shiite state and society. Thus, whether minority grievances are grounded in
reality or not, the important point is that the minorities perceive themselves as
deprived.
Furthermore, globalization and the development of communication technology has
provided ethnic groups with access to the internet, and to satellite TV channels pro-
grammed and broadcasted by their ethnic kin outside the country, as an alternative
source of information to Tehran’s state-sponsored media. Globalization has strength-
ened ethnic sentiments by increasing transnational interaction between ethnic groups
on the both sides of the borders and beyond. The book argues that this consequently
decreases ethnic groups’ dependency on Tehran, and increases their ethnic identity
awareness.
Finally, it is of utmost importance to remember that external actors have always
been a vital challenge to Iran’s national security by playing a role in inﬂuencing if
not mobilizing ethnic groups in Iran. The fact that the Azeris, Kurds, Arabs,
Baluch and Turkmen possess cross-border ethnic afﬁnities increases the likelihood
Review Essay 5
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 E
xe
ter
] a
t 0
8:2
0 0
5 J
an
ua
ry
 20
16
 
of foreign intervention, inﬂuence and internationalization of ethnic issues in Iran. The
book thus moves beyond discussion of the internalization of Iran’s ethnic issues and
looks at its regional dynamics, including the creation of new states in the aftermath of
the collapse of the Soviet Union, or the establishment of an autonomous Kurdistan
region in Iraq.
In sum, numerous factors have shaped and reshaped ethnic identity construction in
Iran. These internal, regional and international changes and dynamics affect Iran’s
national security, by undermining the cohesiveness of national identity and its terri-
torial integrity. Such perceived threats preoccupy the state and the Persian elites’ dis-
courses, and their understanding of Iranian-ness.
Elling: In your book, you argue (correctly, in my opinion) that the ruling elites of modern
Iran have consistently imagined Iranian national identity, or indeed “Iranian-ness” (irâ-
niyyat), as a “uniquely Persian identity” (p. 42). You argue that when consolidating the
modern Iranian nation-state, Reza Shah “deﬁned national as denoting Persian nation-
ality,” and you show how “Persianism” has been used in Iranian nationalism as represen-
tative of “the authentic source of Iranian identity” (p. 58). I agree, but nonetheless I invite
you to think out loud with me: if we agree that there is a policy of Persianization of ethnic
minorities in Iran, then what factors into the underlying idea of “Persian-ness” and “Per-
sianism”? What are the forces behind the idea?
Saleh: The process of nation-state building required Reza Shah to construct a narra-
tive of common language, shared origins and collective historical memory amongst the
Iranians. The new territorially framed national identity was based on Persian identity
and the idea of Aryanism. The term national was conceived as denoting Persian-ness, a
conceptualization that excluded the ethnic minorities. Drawing on Orientalist imagin-
aries, Iranian elite thinkers such as Ahmad Kasravi and Abdul Hussein Zarinkoob
advocated Aryanism and Persian-ness as the origin and basis of Iran’s national identity.
With a lack of academic reasoning, historical knowledge and with little or no critical
analysis, their Persianist approach in creating a national identity generated an anti-
Other sentiment hostile to particular minorities.
In my book, I argue that these policies remained unchanged in the aftermath of the
1979 revolution. The post-revolution state has instrumentally employed Shiism and
Persianism to create a coherent national identity for Iranians. Persianists continued
to produce a narrative on national unity that was based on the promotion of the
Persian language to the exclusion of all other languages. Shiism was presented as a Per-
sianized version of Islam, and along with Persian language, a unifying factor to bind
together different ethnic groups in Iran. Thus, minorities perceive state policies as
being constituted by a particular ideology, which seeks to deﬁne Iranian-ness as
based on the superiority of a Persian/Shiite identity.
This ontologically conﬂicting juxtaposition—Islamism and nationalism or Persian-
ism—led, consequently, to a greater complexity in self-understandings among Ira-
nians. Nationalism invokes notions of the greatness of the pre-Islamic heritage as
an authentic source of Iranian identity, and advocates a territorial patriotism,
6 Elling and Saleh
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whereas Islamism advocates the universally framed concept of Ummah, which does
not recognize borders, race and/or ethnic differences. In other words, the Islamic
Republic has not had a coherent and deﬁnite national identity discourse. In fact,
the Islamic Republic has pragmatically changed its discourse from Islamism to nation-
alism, or from nationalism to Islamism, or sometimes a mixture of them both.
However, the impacts of such shifts on ethnic-religious minorities’ self/other under-
standing remain evident. Statements given by interviewees in my book indicate that
Tehran’s Persianization policy is experienced by respondents as a key threat to their
ethnic identity. Ethnic awareness of such discriminatory policies is widening the
gap between the minorities and the state and thus has further intensiﬁed the politici-
zation of ethnic identity.
Elling:My ﬁnal question pertains to the scale of the problem we both outline in our books.
We agree that ethnic minorities have returned to the political arena and are a force to be
reckoned with. Where we differ is in that you perceive the minority issue as an existential
“threat” to the Islamic Republic, and I refer to it as a “challenge.”
Indeed, while we agree that relative deprivation is important in understanding the
nature of minority discontent, I supplement it with the use of “raised expectations’.” I
argue that despite revolutionary upheaval, bloody war, systematic discrimination and
regional disparity, minorities have also experienced positive developments since the revolu-
tion. This includes signiﬁcant improvements in infrastructure, health services, education
and even some avenues for expressing minority cultures that were hitherto unthinkable.
All of this, I argue, has raised expectations.
This is not meant to exonerate the Islamic Republic; as any reader of my book will
acknowledge, I am keenly aware of all the shortcomings and inequalities generated by
the political system. However, I feel that rather than explaining ethnic mobilization
merely as a reaction against the Islamic Republic’s failure in securing welfare, social
justice and non-discriminatory equality, we should perhaps also understand the mobiliz-
ation as a result of the massive socio-economic and cultural changes that Iran has under-
gone in the last three decades.
This brings us to the question of how to situate the ethnic minority movement within
broader societal and political tendencies. I invite you to consider whether we should under-
stand the growing movement for ethnic rights and recognition as part of a broader move-
ment towards democracy. And, by extension, is the aim of the ethnic movement to
overthrow the Islamic Republic?
Saleh: My book aims at deconstructing the state’s securitization of the ethnic issue
and how such policy has further politicized ethnic identities. By employing the
concept of societal security, I question to what extent the Iranian state has been suc-
cessful in creating a coherent national identity, and how ethnic groups perceive them-
selves today in relation to their Persian counterparts. Tehran’s reluctance to
acknowledge the multifaceted aspects of Iranians’ identities has led to the lack of a
coherent national identity. Instead, the state has employed two conﬂicting strategies
to secure national identity; Persian hegemony and Shiite domination, both of
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which neglect, in their own ways, the ethno-religious minorities’ societal demands.
This, I argue, creates a challenge to Iran’s national identity/security.
My book thus focuses on the implications of identity formation and its impact on
Iran’s national security. I argue that deprivation alone does not lead to ethnic conﬂict.
The combination of a growing sense of deprivation and the politicization of ethnic
identity, however, can lead to conﬂict. According to the ﬁndings of this book,
Tehran has failed to meet ethnic expectations. Ethnic groups perceive their identity
threatened and targeted by the Persianist policies. This has led to a rise in politicized
identity awareness among ethnic minorities, and has widened the ideological gap
between Iran’s ethnic minorities and the state. This consequently may lead to societal
insecurity, which undermines the legitimacy of the state.
According to Barry Buzan, societal security is about identity and concerns language,
culture, religion, national identity and customs. Unlike social security that concerns
the livelihood of people, societal security deals with situations in which societies per-
ceive their identity as threatened. In other words, societal security is about identity,
and groups’ survival in terms of identity. If a majority society attempts to strengthen
its own societal identity, the minority society may react with resistance, causing a
societal security dilemma.
As I argue in my book, ethnic demands and the concept of security can be categor-
ized into “objective” (a real/physical threat) or “subjective” (a perceived threat/non-
physical). Objective, tangible demands include employment, prosperity, health services
and social security. Subjective demands, however, include, for example, those which
refer to identity, ideology, religion and political issues. Although these demands
often overlap, interact and reinforce each other, this book focuses on the subjective
and societal aspect of ethnic demands in Iran. I argue that whether real or imagined,
ethnic sentiments still impact on societal insecurity in Iran. Relative poverty in the
minority regions can be instrumentally employed as a tool by ethnic elites to politicize
their identities and to press demands that target the state as a source of threats to the
survival of the minorities.
Societal insecurity primarily requires the development of discontent, the politiciza-
tion of such discontent, and the intensiﬁcation of frustrations, which ultimately causes
an actualization of the anger in the form of collective mobilization. Ethnic minority
members interviewed in my book expressed the belief that their ethnic identities are
threatened by the state and/or the dominant Persian culture. Ethnic groups perceive
their identity in danger when their language, customs and beliefs are targeted.
However, they also express a broader perception of the “Persianization policy”: not
just cultural elimination but also systemic political marginalization, economic inequal-
ity, the imposition of poverty and the state’s use of coercion. Neglected societal
demands amongst the minorities, together with social expectations, create ethnic grie-
vances, and when politicized, become a major potential source of threat to the state’s
national security.
In short, Tehran’s reliance on the securitization of ethnic demands, and its method
of dealing with the issue through coercive means, has further intensiﬁed the minority
sense of deprivation. This intensiﬁcation was expressed in the ethnic minority discon-
8 Elling and Saleh
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tent of 2005‒07, during which serious unrest occurred in Kurdistan, Khuzestan,
Azerbaijan and Baluchistan. Although economic factors may coincide with ethnic
societal demands, most of the ethnic minority members interviewed for my book per-
ceived themselves as being politically marginalized, and complained about not being
allowed to participate in local or national political decision-making. In other words,
the centralization of the decision-making processes in Tehran, amongst many other
factors, is perceived by the ethnic groups as being part of Tehran’s intentional Persia-
nization policy.
In short, real or perceived, threat or challenge, this book warns that ethnic identity
in Iran has been politicized. Tehran’s reluctance to address the rising ethnic expec-
tations may lead to a greater frustration among the minorities. Other factors such
as the role of mass communication technology, and regional dynamics and changes
also play important roles in increasing ethnic expectations. This is particularly impor-
tant since ethnic minorities in Iran are transnational and located along borders. Ethnic
groups thus tend to look outwards to see their ethnic kin’s situations in the neighbor-
ing countries and set their expectations accordingly, for instance vis-à-vis Kurds in Iraq
or vis-à-vis the Azeris in the Republic of Azerbaijan. As discussed in my book, these
external‒internal dynamics frequently impact Tehran’s domestic ethnic policies as
well as its regional and foreign policy.
Alam Saleh’s questions for Rasmus Christian Elling
Saleh: Your book Minorities in Iran: Nationalism and Ethnicity after Khomeini
mainly deals with the important question of the relations between three actors: the
state, the Persian-centric nationalist elite and the ethnic minority activists. It focuses on
the divisions and differences between these three actors rather than within each of
them. This may raise the following question: How about diversity and divisions within
each ethnic group? Does the book perceive each group as having a coherent discursive
approach towards the others? If not, what are the intra-ethnic diversities?
Elling: One of the main theoretical arguments of my book is that we need to treat
“groupism”—that is, the essentialist grand narratives on ethnic and national identi-
ties—as a social rather than a sociological fact. Contrary to reductionist views on
groups and identities, the social scientist must understand diversity as dynamics poten-
tially involving more than one of numerous factors, including ethnic, linguistic, reli-
gious, sectarian, regional, tribal, socio-economic, gender and age. The sort of
“overviews of ethnic demography” or “ethnic maps’” that we often see in major
western works of reference or in journalistic accounts, which divide Iranians into
neat boxes of ethnic categorization tied up to particular geographic regions and
with “statistics’” or estimated numbers for each category, are fundamentally ﬂawed.
Such “ethnic” numbers and maps are entirely ﬁctitious and misleading—we do not,
in fact, have any large-scale data on how Iranians tend to categorize themselves.
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Nonetheless, we often see how this supposed knowledge is exploited for political ends,
be it from Iranian nationalists seeking to belittle the minority issue, from minority
activists blowing it out of proportions or from western powers seeking to abuse it
towards their own goals in the region.
The “ethnic mapping” also neglects important historical, social dynamics that run
counter to the logic of division on which the mapping takes shape. Iran has seen cen-
turies of ethnic intermingling, exogamy, continuous in-migration [… ], and the evol-
ution of supra-ethnic or cosmopolitan notions of identity. This means that there are
many Iranians who do not consider themselves to belong to any one category—they
are simply “Iranians’.” Minority activists may counter that these people are in fact
“the Persians’”: the Persian-speaking Shiite majority that considers itself to constitute
the essence of Iranian-ness, and through that position, marginalizes minority commu-
nities. However, I argue in my book that that is not a full explanation: there are many
Iranians who simply will not identify in particular ethnic terms, and we need to take
them into account when discussing diversity. I attempt in my work to deal with this
through a concept of “elusive majority” and by examining the ﬂexibility of markers
such as “Iranian” and “Persian” as examples of the situated-ness of self-identiﬁcation.
On the level of particular communities, there are numerous factors further compli-
cating simplistic representations. For example, there are great differences between, say,
an Azeri in Ardabil who speaks Azeri Turkic every day, and a Tehrani who descends
from Azeri parents but may in fact have very little knowledge of Azeri language or
culture. Another example could be the signiﬁcant differences between a Shiite Kurd
in Kermanshah and a Sunni Kurd in Marivan. These two may both understand them-
selves to be Kurds, but their ideas of their situation and identity may differ consider-
ably when we dig deeper than the label “Kurd.” Regional, sub-regional and tribal
belonging as well as gender, age and class play into ethnicity on different levels and
in different ways. In other words, when dealing with ethnicity as a scholar, we need
to question ethnic self-understandings in both majority and minority terms that rep-
resent communities, populations and nations as static, internally homogenous, exter-
nally bounded identities. Ethnicity is not a ﬁxed marker revealing an unchanging,
inner essence but a ﬂuctuating marker that politicizes cultural difference.
The minority question in Iran is thus not simply about particular groups facing
other groups, nor is ethnicity reducible to majority/minority or state/periphery
relations; indeed, there are also historic tensions between some minority communities.
Examples include scattered tensions between Kurds and Azeris, or between Dezfulis
and Arabs in Khuzestan. This topic, however, is severely understudied, and although
my book is the ﬁrst attempt at a comprehensive study of ethnicity and nationalism in
post-Khomeini Iran, it only scratches the surface. Ideally, we should see a wide, inter-
disciplinary ﬁeld of study emerge.
Saleh: The transnational nature and geographic location of certain ethnic groups in Iran
seems to increase the likelihood of foreign inﬂuence, manipulation or intervention. This is
particularly important considering the inﬂuence of external actors on Iran’s ethnic policies.
10 Elling and Saleh
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How does your book help us in explaining such a regional security complex and its impact
on Iran’s domestic security discourses?
Elling: I believe that there are two dimensions to this question. On the one hand,
there is the very real history of foreign powers’ self-serving exploitation of discontent
amongst certain communities on Iran’s territorial periphery; and on the other hand,
there is the instrumental exploitation of this historical fact by Iran’s current ruling
elites in order to counter minority and regional mobilization. In other words, there
are certainly genuine concerns in the ruling elites and the broader population that
foreign powers, both global and regional players, have, can and will interfere and
seek to manipulate minorities in Iran. Belligerent strategies of divide-and-conquer
or of sowing internal discord and thus weakening the Iranian state are evident in
many spheres, including that of minorities. Numerous journalistic accounts have
dealt with recent examples of this interference, including among Kurds and Baluchis.
However, it also seems clear that certain powers in Iran are intent on blowing the
threat of foreign manipulation out of proportion. There are two reasons for this.
Firstly, the foreign threat is used as an excuse to employ excessive force against
ethnic minority activists in Iran, whether the activists in question are militant or
peaceful, and whether they adhere to Iran’s territorial integrity or are avowed separa-
tists. With this excuse, the military, intelligence and political elites can criminalize any
and all expressions of minority culture or regional aspirations deemed to cross the “red
line” and unwritten rules. The ruling elites can brand any and all minority activists as
separatists, ﬁfth-columnists and traitors by claiming that their activism runs counter to
national security. Needless to say, this securitization of the minority issue has had a
grave detrimental impact on minority activism in Iran. It has forced numerous activists
to work underground, in fear of their safety, and it has radicalized many activists who
may, in desperation over their lack of freedom of expression, be attracted to extremist
ideologies of ethnic chauvinism, sectarianism or separatism. In that sense, the securi-
tization of the minority issue tends to produce the very enemies it was supposed to
eliminate. Current President Hassan Rouhani has promised to put an end to this
securitization of the minority issue, but it remains to be seen if he will and can live
up to this promise.
Secondly, the foreign menace is also used by politicians as an excuse to dismiss
ethnic minority grievances. The argument, ritualistically repeated in Iranian state
media and ofﬁcial discourse, is that the minority discontent expressed through dem-
onstrations, riots, attacks on military installations or in online media is merely the
work of a handful of radicals living in exile where they are bankrolled by Iran’s foes
to create havoc and ruin the harmonious co-existence of Iranians. This argument belit-
tles and derides the genuine discontent amongst certain minorities, and it distorts the
reasons for unrest rather than explains them. This in turn further cements the feeling
of alienation and marginalization.
Saleh: Your book aptly studies elite discourses in detail, focusing on how these discourses
aim to construct a Self, be it the state elites, nationalist elites or minority elites. While I
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agree that each were able in some cases to mobilize their constituencies, there are however
also some cases where they were not. During the Iran‒Iraq war, for instance, Arabs in
Khuzestan arguably remained loyal to Iran rather than shifting allegiance to the
Iraqi, Arab side. To what extent do you think each of the three actors have been successful
in shaping or mobilizing such identities in today’s Iran? How do people respond to the
discourses?
Elling: Again, I believe we need to discard the groupist terminology in order to answer
this question. Certainly, by far the majority of Arabs in Khuzestan rejected Saddam
Hussein’s overtures before and during the Iran‒Iraq war, and I believe that the
majority of Arabs in Khuzestan are similarly rejecting the pan-Arabic and sectarian
propaganda emanating from certain Arab countries in the Persian Gulf today. In
other words, the Arabs of Khuzestan, when threatened with foreign military interfer-
ence or with well-ﬁnanced propaganda from the outside, will mostly reject and resist,
and in the process, they may frame this resistance as a patriotic duty towards Iran. It is
indeed my impression that many if not most of Khuzestan’s Arabs strongly identify
with Iran as a historical entity.
However, that does not mean that they cannot identify with other historical enti-
ties, traditions or identity discourses. Ethnicity is situational and contextual. In one
context, an Arab from Khuzestan will deﬁne him or herself as Iranian; and in
another context, he or she will self-deﬁne as Arab. For example, if a Khuzestani
Arab does not feel that his or her culture and lived reality is reﬂected in Iranian
state media, he or she may switch to a foreign Arabic-language satellite station on
the TV set. In the long run, such choices may strengthen the self-identiﬁcation as
Arab. However, the same person may also have to, depending on the context,
deﬁne him or herself in regional terms, say as Ahwazi or Khorramshahri or Shadegani;
perhaps in tribal or clan terms, depending on the situation; and obviously, he or she
will often have to relate to his or her gender, class and age identity.
All of these factors are contingent, and despite the claims of both Iranian nation-
alists and local ethnic minority dissidents, no factor is unchangeable, overriding or
ﬁxed in time and space. In that sense, certain discourses may “succeed” in some
cases, but will not necessarily succeed in other cases. That Arabs in Khuzestan resisted
the Iraqi invasion with patriotic fervor does not mean that many Arabs today are not
disillusioned with the Iranian state and its ruling elites. In fact, the two are directly
connected: Arabs are frustrated by the fact that after having paid a huge price
during the Iran‒Iraq war, and while they live in Iran’s most resource-rich region,
most Arabs today are nonetheless suffering under unbearable socio-economic con-
ditions, extreme pollution and systemic discrimination. When the explanation for
this suffering is framed in ethnic terms, it will resonate with certain segments of
the Arab communities, while the discourse of the state that stresses perennial
multi-ethnic harmony, Muslim fraternity and the meta-historical inevitability of
national unity may fail to convince.
What is interesting is that ethnicity has been quite neglected in Iranian Studies.
Save for the tremendous efforts of anthropologists in understanding nomadic tribes
12 Elling and Saleh
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in pre-revolution Iran, and for a handful of articles that have criticized Persian-cen-
trism, there is a severe paucity of research. Often, scholars merely mention in
passing that a very considerable segment of Iran’s population deﬁnes itself in terms
other than the stereotypical, Persian-speaking Shiite national Self. That is a shame,
because it is perceived by those not represented in the mainstream history-writing
as deliberate discrimination and marginalization. It is now time to break the silence
on contentious aspects of ethnic diversity in Iran, and I believe that the two works
discussed here are the ﬁrst serious attempts at doing exactly that. I hope that our
fellow scholars will join us in the discussion, and that it will become less sensitive
for scholars and less dangerous for their informants to engage in exchange and
debate on this issue. It is long overdue.
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